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Abstract
The analysis of monetary policy rules has been confined to models not
capable of examining situations where an economy is converging to a
higher balanced growth path. For the small open economies having
entered the European Union recently this is however a very relevant
question. The main aim of their integration is convergence itself and
most of the criteria they have to fulfil in order to become members of
the euro zone are of monetary nature. It is thus of special interest for
them whether and how the chosen strategy of monetary policy aiming
at the fulfilment of the requirements they face affects the transition.
In this paper a first attempt is made to compare monetary policy rules
in a monetary model of small open economies, which builds essentially
on the convergence literature. The results show that the economy
behaves very differently in the transition under the different monetary
policy rules examined.
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1 Introduction
The “eastern enlargement” of the European Union (EU) took place in May
2004. With this – in terms of population – biggest enlargement in the history
of the EU ten countries became members. Most of the new members (Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia) are small open economies (Poland being the most
notable exception) and except for Malta and Cyprus they are approaching
the end of a postsocialist transition process from their centrally planned
economies to market economies (the transition can be regarded as finished
insofar as the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria are concerned, which
was a condition of entering the EU). On accession the new members also
became candidates for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union of
Europe, since unlike some of the current members they do not have any opt-
out clauses. The entry into the euro zone, however, requires the fulfilment of
different eligibility criteria (the convergence criteria of Maastricht). Apart
for the condition concerning the level of public debt and the budget deficit,
these requirements are of monetary nature: the stability of the exchange rate
against the euro, stability of the price level and a corresponding level for the
long-run interest rates (which is connected to both) have to be satisfactorily
achieved. Because of this monetary policy has a very important role to play
in these countries. How should it be designed? What strategy would be
preferable for these countries?
If we look at the current design of monetary policy in the ten countries, we
find a very diverse picture. From giving up monetary autonomy completely
and relying on the very strict fixed exchange rate system of a currency board
(Estonia, Latvia among others) to a completely free float combined with in-
flation targeting (Poland, Czech Republic for example) different strategies
are being followed.
Theory does not give too much guidance, either.1 This may seem surpris-
ing at first sight, since there are many monetary general equilibrium models
analysing the optimality and characteristics of monetary policy rules in sev-
eral different set-ups, also for the case of a small open economy.2 But most
of these models abstract from production completely or include production
using labour as the only input while physical capital does not explicitly ap-
1Though theoretical guidance would be especially important for these countries because
for any econometric analysis the reliable and comparable time series are very short to get
interpretable results, that is empirical studies cannot help much either.
2For closed economy see Gal´ı (2002) or Woodford (2003); two-country models can be
found in Obstfeld-Rogoff (1995 and 1998), a model for a small open economy is presented
in Gal´ı-Monacelli (2002).
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pear. Moreover, they examine economies being close to their steady-states
in low-inflation environments. None of these assumptions are a good approx-
imation in the case of the new members (although low inflation has already
been achieved in many of these countries). They are not supposed to be
close to steady-state, but on their transition path towards it or in a catch-up
process converging to a higher balanced growth path. This convergence is
also one of the goals of their integration and is in my opinion a non-negligible
characteristic of these economies.
Using models of convergence could be another approach. Here one can find
growth models that build different frictions into an otherwise neoclassical
framework in order to get a speed of convergence in the range of empirical
estimates. (In open economies under neoclassical assumptions convergence
would be immediate as it is optimal to jump to the balanced growth path
making up for the missing resources by borrowing from abroad.) But these
are usually non-monetary models.3
There are of course models including both capital and money explicitly, as
well, but these are mainly dealing with closed economies and more impor-
tantly the basic model describing the real economy is not a convergence
model, that is it is not capable of analysing the convergence behaviour of an
open economy. The tools for empirically oriented modelling became primar-
ily probably the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approaches (DSGE-
models) such as for example Smets–Wouters (2003) or Del Negro et. al. (2004)
to mention only a few newer, well-known examples. These models are not
aiming for modelling convergence either and for better empirical results they
are assuming many different types of nominal rigidities. To my knowledge
only Benczu´r (2003) and Benczu´r–Ko´nya (2004) and (2005)4 use certain ele-
ments necessary for modelling convergence, but their goal differs from mine:
instead of concentrating on the interactions of monetary policy and conver-
gence and the role of monetary policy in it, they are examining the real effects
of different nominal shocks.
The interaction between transition (real convergence) and monetary pol-
icy is not at all impossible. Already in 1979 Stanley Fischer showed in his
article that the results of e.g. Sidrauski (1967) about the superneutrality of
money hold true only in the steady-state. Superneutrality in the steady state
also requires rather special assumptions, but even in his model where this
holds, money affects transition: the speed of convergence is not independent
of the growth rate of the nominal money supply. For the transition money is
3See for example Barro–Mankiw–Sala-i-Martin (1995), Chatterjee–Sakoulis–Turnovsky
(2001), Lane (2001).
4The 2005 article is a later version of the 2004 paper.
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superneutral only if the utility function is logarithmic, but for the constant
elasticity of substitution form most commonly used in empirical applications
it is not.
I believe that all three basic elements mentioned (small open economies,
convergence and monetary nature) are essential for an analysis of optimal
monetary policy in the case of these countries. So as a contribution to the
existing body of literature this study tries to combine the three. In order
to avoid making such a complex model very complicated and for having
tractable results, I will try to keep the structure as simple as possible choos-
ing the simplest setup and introducing money into it. I would like to note
already here, that the model assumes flexible prices, so differs from the ap-
proach most widely used for empirical purposes. This was chosen in part for
simplicity reasons, and partly because the introduction of sticky prices would
require the assumption of monopolistic competition which is questionable in
the case of small open economies where foreign competition is very fierce. A
similar model is set up in Benczu´r (2003) and Benczu´r–Ko´nya (2005): the
focus is precisely on small open economies, they use assumptions enabling
the modelling of convergence, furthermore they choose the same way to intro-
duce money into the model (they also apply the money in the utility function
approach) and they do not have nominal rigidities either. Their goal is pre-
cisely to show that in their structure nominal shocks can have real effects
even without nominal rigidities. Their model thus differs in its focus as writ-
ten before and also the “convergence model” taken as basis here builds on
a different assumption than the one used by them (here constrained capital
mobility is supposed, while there investment incurs adjustment costs).
This is a theoretical paper, it does not include a detailed empirical appli-
cation or analysis. Nevertheless, it is useful to link the questions examined
by the model and the results to the actual economic relationships or so-called
stylised facts. Being a complex phenomenon, convergence depends on numer-
ous factors. The model presented here concentrates only on a single element
of these: the potential role of monetary policy in bringing about convergence.
Exactly because of this complex nature of the problem, it would be difficult
to lend empirical footing to the conclusions of the model. It would however
be undoubtedly interesting to examine whether these hold in reality or not.
This could be the subject of another research programme, and is beyond the
scope of the current paper. Therefore, I would like to confine to illustrating
with some examples the empirical background of the questions analysed here.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, correspondingly I will try
to give some illustrative examples of the analysed phenomena via a graphical
comparison of macroeconomic time series as indicated. Section 3 then builds
up the model, section 4 delivers the solutions of it and summarizes the con-
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ditions describing the competitive equilibrium. The dynamic analysis of the
model’s behaviour under different monetary policy rules follows in section 5,
while section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical examples
Economic development is in general measured by the per capita level of the
real gross domestic product (GDP). The relative position of a country can
then be shown by relating this to a benchmark economy. Convergence or
divergence will be accordingly expressed by the change of this ratio through
time. Hence, to compare the development of certain economies, a compa-
rable form of this measure is called for. The so-called Penn World Table
(PWT) offers a useful database to this aim.5 The PWT is built on an in-
ternational comparison of prices. This is used to express the elements of
the national accounts in purchasing power parity terms (that is, through a
common system of prices, in a common “currency”), and thus enables a real
quantity comparison in time and space, so between different countries too.
It also provides information on relative prices within and between countries,
demographic data and capital stock estimates. The database contains annual
data for the period 1950-2000 (as a whole or in part) for 168 countries and
23 variables.
To illustrate the questions analysed here (in section 5) I chose Ireland
and Japan, since for them data are available for the whole period6, and they
developed at a fast pace during these decades, making up for a large part
of the distance in the per capita level of real GDP to the USA (which is
typically taken as benchmark for such comparisons). The growth rate of
the real GDP in Japan during the period was 4.81 percent on average, in
Ireland 3.64 percent, while in the United States of America it only amounted
to 2.27 percent. This means that these countries got closer to the economic
performance of the USA in these fifty years, which is shown on figure 1.
The figure also shows that while Ireland’s convergence has been rather
slow during most of the period and the spectular catch-up took place in the
last decade, Japan converged fastly in the first two decades, its development
5Heston, Alan – Summers, Robert – Aten, Bettina: Penn World Table Version
6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CI-
CUP), October 2002 (accessible: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php site/pwt index.php).
About the methodology see Summers–Heston [1991], and for Version 6.1: http://
pwt.econ.upenn.edu/Documentation/append61.pdf.
6Moreover, for both of them direct price comparison exercises have taken place, i.e. they
were both benchmark countries in the PWT surveys (Japan in all of them, Ireland with
the only exception of the first survey).
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Figure 1: Per capita GDP in Ireland and Japan relative to that of the USA
(in percent)
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slowed down thereafter and the tendency even reversed in the last decade,
when the growth rate of GDP in the USA exceeded that of Japan (see the
table below showing average growth rates).
GDP growth in GDP growth in GDP growth in
Decade Ireland Japan the US
1950s 1.86% 7.13% 1.37%
1960s 3.46% 9.26% 2.87%
1970s 3.16% 3.08% 2.66%
1980s 3.51% 3.53% 2.15%
1990s 6.22% 1.05% 2.3%
Which factors examined in this paper can this convergence be related to?
I would like to emphasize once more that I am not aiming for a thorough
statistical analysis of the question, I just want to illustrate from the empirical
side my theoretical results with the help of some examples. As we will see,
the theoretical literature gives an important role for example to the openness
of an economy when explaining convergence. Openness can support faster
development through different channels. The data from the PWT seem to
confirm this, the relationship is very close between the two factors, as shown
also by the scatter diagram in figure 2.
The model shown here focuses on the relationship between convergence
and monetary policy: it analyses, how monetary policy could further con-
vergence. The results will differ under different monetary policy rules. Sim-
plifying a bit, we could refer to two main conclusions.7 According to one,
7See section 5 for the details or section 6 for a summary of the conclusions.
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Figure 2: The relationship between openness and real GDP



























(under money supply rule) the faster increase of the quantity of money leads
to higher speed of convergence, supporting the catch-up process. The data
seem to underpin this, both in the case of the more liquid component (M1),
and of the broader monetary aggregate (M3). For the sake of conciseness,
figure 3 presents the scatter diagrams only for M1.8
Figure 3: The relationship between the growth rates of M1 and GDP







































The other (partly contradicting) conclusion refers to the negative rela-
tionship between inflation and convergence. Under the inflation targeting
regime or a feedback rule for interest rates lower inflation can result in faster
convergence. This means a similar, but negative relationship, which figure
4 presents. The figure shows inflation (calculated from the consumer price
index data of the European Central Bank) and real GDP on a scatter di-
agram. The negative relationship between the variables is evident for both
countries.
8The Penn World Table does not contain monetary data. The time series for the
monetary aggregates are from the database of the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS).
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Figure 4: The relationship between inflation and GDP























The results of the model can thus also be motivated empirically. But
providing them with a thorough empirical basis would be the subject of an
independent econometric research. Therefore, in this section I was trying to
simply illustrate them, and the figures presented should not be interpreted as
providing statistical evidence for the results: they only serve these illustrative
purposes.
In the next section I turn to the presentation of the model.
3 Economic Environment
My goal is to develop a model for analysing monetary policy in the case of
converging small open economies. Within this model convergence means the
process of reaching the steady state from the starting point: this is the path
taking the economy from the state given by the initial conditions to the one
characterised by a balanced growth path.9 As argued in the introduction, I
believe that for this we need a monetary model of a small open economy in
transition. In this first and simplest attempt I chose the model setup used
in Lane (2001), which is a modified version of the one by Barro–Mankiw–
Sala-i-Martin (1995). This is the dynamic general equilibrium model of a
9Convergence in the model will thus correspond to the stable saddle path heading
towards the steady-state. To examine this of course it needs to be uniquely determined,
which holds in all the cases analysed here. More precisely convergence means approaching
the steady-state on this path, the speed of moving towards the steady-state on this path
is called the speed of convergence. Transition means moving on this path instead of
being already in the steady-state, so I am not dealing with transition in the sense of
moving between two saddle paths, so that the subsequent steady-states will also be different
(transition could then bring the economy to a different path with a higher rate of balanced
growth than is achievable through the path belonging to the given starting point).
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small open economy in continuous time, where capital mobility is constrained
(completely free in some areas, while completely prohibited in others), which
enables a straightforward handling of the model structure, while slowing
down convergence. (It can be seen from the article that calibrated versions
of the model yield results for the convergence speed that are in line with
empirical estimates under realistic parameter values.)
To ”monetize” the model economy I chose the money in the utility function
approach following an article of Stanley Fischer.10
The economy is populated with a large number of infinitely lived identical
competitive households owning capital in the economy. With these resources
they are operating the production technology themselves, so they are the
producers in the economy, as well. Let us have a closer look at the productive
activity conducted by the economic agents first.
3.1 Firms’ Problem
We assume a large number of essentially identical households having access
to the same production technology (this means that examining the problem
of a representative producer is sufficient). They are selling their final product
on a competitive market being small relative to it so having no market power.
The production process consists of two phases. First intermediate products
are being produced used later as inputs for producing the final products. We
consider two main types of inputs: traded and nontraded ones (yT and yN in
per capita terms). Both are produced using different physical capital goods
(kT and kN , also in per capita form).
11 No labour input is employed in the
production of the products. The production functions of the intermediate
products have the following Cobb–Douglas form:
yT = Ak
α
T yN = Ak
α
N (1)
Here A is the exogenous productivity parameter of the economy and α is
the capital share. Note, that we assumed α and A being the same in the
production of the two inputs, which simplifies the analysis. By this assump-
tion (the same capital intensity and productivity across sectors) the growth
effects resulting from the variation in productivity between the traded and
non-traded sectors are ruled out for now.
10Fischer (1979). This approach was introduced in Sidrauski (1967).
11As this is a model in continuous time, all variables depend on time in a continuous
way. I should actually write yT (t), yN (t), kT (t), kN (t)) where t is the index of time. To
simplify the exposition I will use yT , yN , kT , kN . This also applies to the other variables
used in the model later on: (M,p,m,X, c, d).
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The final output is produced using the intermediate products as inputs
in the following way:
y = y1−θN y
θ
T ,
where θ can be interpreted as the degree of openness since it stands for
the relative size of the traded goods’ “sector”. Substituting the production






Output can be consumed or invested (equally used as consumption good or
capital good).
Now we impose a borrowing constraint: the country can borrow at perfect
capital markets but only limited amount not exceeding the value of capital
in the traded sector because this is the only acceptable collateral12. If we
denote the real per capita debt (borrowed funds) by d, we assume formally
that d ≤ kT . Practically optimality will require then: d = kT to speed
up growth and convergence as much as international capital markets make
it possible. This also means that the net return on capital in the traded
sector (its marginal product minus depreciation) has to equal the world real
interest rate (in the sector open to international trade the rates of return at








= rw + δ (3)
Here δ denotes the rate of depreciation and rw is the world interest rate.
Taking this condition and using the borrowing constraint we have:




We can rewrite the production function accordingly:
y = BkηN (5)







1−αθ and η = α−αθ
1−αθ
, 0 < η < 1. The assumption of
constrained international capital mobility is useful as it slows down conver-
gence in the case of an open economy and it makes the analysis simpler by
reducing the number of variables in the model.
12Several reasons could be mentioned for this, for example it is easier to impose sanctions
on this sector or this capital is useful also to foreign investors as opposed to the one in the
nontraded sector. See Lane (2001) p.224. for more details.
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3.2 The question of relative prices
In this setup there is actually no market where the capital goods would be
rented: they are owned and used by the households. Similarly, there is no
market where intermediate products are bought and sold, again, they are
produced and used as inputs by the same households. But implicitly these
markets and the prices that would prevail there are defined. It is possible
to calculate shadow rental prices (implicitly we have already used the rental
price of kT for example) and also shadow relative prices of the three different
products (yT , yN and y). This would give us an equivalent solution (the real
rate of return on kT will be the same) as I will show now.
If we look at the (implicit) problem of production separately, a represen-
tative productive unit (here the household) realizes its output as income and
incurs the rental payments of the resources used in the production process as
costs. There are actually three different production processes with the same
objective of profit maximisation where all prices and quantities (rN , rT , pN ,
pT , kN , kT ) must be nonnegative. The three different output goods define
implicitly the price system in the economy: pT will stand for the price of the
tradable intermediate good, pN for the price of the non-tradable one and p
for the price of the final product. Here one price can be normalised to one as
only the relative prices matter. The natural choice would be pT , but in order
to have the same structure where we have expressed everything in units of
the single final good I will assume p = 1, so the price of the final product
will be normalised.
In the “traded sector” the production problem is then the maximisation





















Let us now turn to the maximisation problem in the final goods’ sector:
max y1−θN y
θ
T − pNyN − pTyT ,
11
















































This is the rate of return of capital in the traded sector which net of depre-
ciation has to equal the world real interest rate in the model. As we can see,
this really equals (3) from which (4) follows. Including the relative prices
would lead to an equivalent formula for the real interest rate and thus would
not change any results of the model.
3.3 Preferences – the problem of the households
We have already mentioned that there is a huge number of identical house-
holds with infinite life horizon in the economy. As they are the producers
too, part of their income equals production (y). Note, that there is no labour
input here, so profits may seem to be positive (there is a surplus over the
value “paid” for using the inputs, see previous part), but actually this is
the compensation of the household for its time spent by working (in self-
employment). The households thus realise the value of the output produced
as a whole. They also have the net stock of foreign debt (d in per capita
terms), so funds borrowed from abroad is also a source of income (d˙, a dot
over a variable represents its time derivative, intuitively its change over time).
Money is introduced through lump sum transfers of the government (x per
12
capita), also income for the households. The total income of the households
is thus: y + d˙+ x.
This income can then be spent on consumption (c in per capita real terms),
investment (I) and accumulating money (m denotes the real balances)13, but
the households also have to pay interest on the stock of debt with the interest
rate being rw. Thus the consumers’ expenses are: c + I + rwd + m˙ + mpi.
According to the law of motion for the capital stock it is increased by invest-
ment and reduced by depreciation, that is k˙ = I − δk, where δ is the rate
of depreciation as before. Using this for substituting investment and taking
everything in real terms (measured in units of the final good), the budget
constraint of the representative household is the following:
y + d˙+ x = c+ (k˙N + k˙T ) + δ(kN + kT ) + r
wd+ m˙+mpi
Here we supposed the same rates of depreciation for the two kinds of capital.
Using (4) this becomes:
k˙N + m˙ = (1− αθ)y + x− c− δkN −mpi
The household thus makes a decision about its consumption and saving first.
Secondly it also makes a portfolio choice about what to use its savings for:
accumulating capital stock or real money balances.









dt where β, γ, σ > 0, β + γ ≤ 1 (10)
subject to k˙N + m˙ = (1− αθ)Bk
η
N + x− c− δkN −mpi
k(0) = kN(0) + kT (0) > 0
c,m, kN , kT , d ≥ 0
rw, P ≥ 0 and x given,





(kN + kT − d)e
−rwt ≥ 0 (no-Ponzi condition)
13Money is essentially a nominal category (usually denoted by M , understood here in
per capita terms). The consumer can only make a decision about the stock of nominal
money, but actually he is interested in the purchasing power of it. So real terms matter
for the consumer’s decision. Real balances are usually defined as m = M/p where p is
the price level, so M˙/p = m˙ + mpi follows where pi = p˙/p stands for the inflation rate.
This is what appears in the real terms budget constraint. (Note, that the only essentially
nominal categories are M and X = xp in the budget constraint as we will see. X stands
for the nominal per capita lump sum transfers of the government. The foreign debt, d is
however understood in real terms.)
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This is the well known dynamic optimisation problem in continuous time:
the household aims at maximising its utility subject to certain constraints.
The specification of the utility function has the constant elasticity of substi-
tution (or constant relative risk aversion) form with the parameters σ, β and
γ; ρ is the subjective discount rate.
With this specification utility is positive for any c,m > 1 and the marginal
utility of both consumption and money is also positive with the above as-
sumptions about the parameters (consuming one more unit or holding one
more unit of real balances increases the utility of the agent). The concavity
of the utility function in the two arguments is also guaranteed as β(1−σ) < 1
and γ(1 − σ) < 1 that is satisfied. This means that the marginal utility is
decreasing: the higher the level of consumption (or real balances) is, the less
extra utility can be gained by consuming one more unit (or holding one more
unit of real balances). The second order cross partial derivatives are positive
(the derivative of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to the
stock of real balances and the derivative of the marginal utility of money
with respect to consumption, which are actually equal in this symmetrically
structured model) when σ < 1 and negative if σ > 1. In the case of positive
cross derivatives the marginal utility of consumption is an increasing func-
tion of the holdings of real balances (“complementarity”) and vice versa. The
opposite is true for negative cross partial derivatives (“substitutability”).
The risk aversion parameter concerning the first argument is 1 − β + βσ,
while for the second one 1− γ + γσ. The intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution for consumption and money is the inverse of the corresponding risk
aversion parameter. In this deterministic model the risk aversion parameter
does not have a great importance, but it is not true for the inverse of it. If
the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1 (this is the case when σ < 1)
then the agent is relatively willing to substitute between periods, so willing
to let consumption (and here also the level of real balances) vary over time.
In the other case of σ > 1 when the elasticity of substitution is less than
1, there is significant consumption (and real balance) smoothing.14 I have
not said much about the role of the other parameters β and γ so far: the
higher the β/γ ratio is, the higher will be the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and real balances (the ratio of the marginal utility of
consumption to the marginal utility of money) for given levels of c and m.
Let us turn to the constraints after having discussed the objective function.
The first constraint is the budget constraint where we used (5). The second
14This also means that in the first case (low σ) the substitution effect will dominate if
the interest rate rises (savings will increase), while in the second case (high σ) the income
effect will dominate (savings will fall). For σ = 1 the two effects cancel out, savings will
not change.
14
one is an initial condition: we have to start with a positive amount of cap-
ital, while the next two prescribe the nonnegativity of variables and prices
taken as given by the consumers. The fifth condition is necessary for the bor-
rowing constraint to be binding. To see this, imagine the opposite situation
when kN(0)+kT (0)−d(0) ≥ k
∗
N (asterisks denote steady-state values). Here
the economy can jump instantaneously to the steady-state, since domestic
resources suffice for financing k∗N and foreign borrowing can be increased to
finance k∗T . With the constraint given above this is not possible and obviously
this is the more interesting case to study in this context. The usual no-Ponzi
condition (the last one) states that we cannot play Ponzi games, the present
value of our net assets cannot be negative, so we have to be able to pay our
debts back. Notice that this is actually not necessary here, as according to
the borrowing constraint d ≤ kT , so the terms in brackets cannot be less
than kN , which is nonnegative.
3.4 Government
The government plays a very simple role in this model: it provides the eco-
nomic agents with money. It has no other function, so I abstract from gov-
ernment purchases and bonds. This also means that its budget has to be
balanced. It gives lump sum money transfers to the households, so its bud-
get constraint with a balanced budget is M˙ = X in nominal terms. Writing
it in real terms we have:
m˙+mpi = x (11)
4 Equilibrium
Let us now solve the household’s problem. The corresponding Hamiltonian:





Here λ is the current value multiplier, this is the shadow price of an additional
unit of income received in period t expressed in terms of utility in the current




= (1− αθ)ηBkη−1N − δ + pi (12)
(β − 1− βσ)
c˙
c
+ (γ − γσ)
m˙
m
= −(1− αθ)ηBkη−1N + δ + ρ (13)
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To interpret equation (12), notice that the left-hand side of this equation is
the ratio of the marginal utility of money to the marginal utility of consump-
tion, while the right-hand side is actually the domestic nominal interest rate.
The marginal rate of substitution between real balances and consumption
therefore equals the relative price of these two. Equation (13) is a dynamic
condition (the equivalent of an intertemporal Euler equation in the model).
According to this the optimal growth path of consumption and real balances
depends on the distance from the steady-state: on the right-hand side we
have the difference of the real interest rate in the steady-state (ρ as we will
see later) and the actual domestic real interest rate. If the difference in the
returns is big, than the transition is faster, whereas close to the steady-state
it is slower as the difference in the rates of returns is much smaller.
It is useful to take a look at the role of σ in this equation. If σ < 1 (the
case of positive cross derivatives and little smoothing effect), then the signs
of the coefficients of c˙/c and m˙/m differ, so these change in the same direc-
tion: if m˙/m is increasing (decreasing) then so is c˙/c. On the other hand, if
σ > 1 (negative cross derivatives, strong smoothing effect), the signs of the
coefficients will be the same, and the quotients are going to change in the
opposite direction: an increase (decrease) in the growth rate of real balances
brings about a decrease (increase) in the growth rate of consumption. (These
statements hold ceteris paribus as a decrease in the difference of the rates of
return can offset this in both cases.) If σ = 1, then m (β) does not appear in
this equation, the formula will simplify to −c˙/c = −(1−αθ)ηBkη−1N + ρ+ δ.
Intuitively, in the first case consumption and real balances are “complemen-
tary” goods, so their rate of growth changes in the same direction in the
optimum. In the second case they are “substitutes”, so the two growth rates
change in the opposite direction. In a resource constrained situation, con-
sumption is limited as we can only consume output that is smaller due to
the smaller amount of capital goods and because of the high rate of return
on capital we are strongly motivated not to consume too much of it. Thus
it is relatively easier to increase utility by increasing real money holdings,
which can later be substituted for by consumption as it becomes relatively
cheaper, so more available. In the last case this interaction is missing be-
tween holding money and the marginal utility of consumption (or vice versa),
that’s why the consumption path only depends on the difference between the
steady-state and actual real interest rates, and the quantity of money will
be determined separately (see equation (12) for this). Here consumption is
clearly increasing by a decreasing rate during transition as the difference in
returns is disappearing.
Of course the budget constraint has to be observed in the optimum, as well.




λ(kT + kN − d)e
−ρt = 0. This puts a restriction on
the terminal value of the household’s net capital stocks in terms of utility,
because λ is the multiplier used in the Hamiltonian, which is equal to the
marginal utility of consumption. According to this for an allocation to be
optimal, either the present discounted value of the capital stock net of debts
is zero, or if not, then the marginal utility of consumption is zero (the house-
hold could not increase its utility by selling its net assets and consuming
more). Without this we clearly could not be in optimum. Because of the
borrowing constraint it would actually suffice to write lim
t→∞
λkNe
−ρt = 0 here,
so the condition only refers to the stock of non-tradable capital in this model.
In the equilibrium it is also true that all markets clear, that is
1. for the goods market: k˙N = (1− αθ)Bk
η
N − c− δkN ;
2. for the money market: m˙+mpi = x.
The conditions describing the optimum of the consumer (12) and (13) actu-
ally give us the solution of the model (optimum conditions for consumers and
producers combined). So the equilibrium in our case can be fully described
by the transversality condition, the budget constraint of the government (this
equals the clearing condition of the money market here), the market clearing
condition for the goods market (these two assure the observance of the bud-
get constraint of the representative consumer, as well) and equations (12)
and (13). Let us repeatedly summarize these equations here.
lim
t→∞
λ(kT + kN − d)e
−ρt = 0
m˙+mpi = x
(1− αθ)BkηN − c− δkN = k˙N
(1− αθ)ηBkη−1N − δ + pi =
γc
βm
(β − 1− βσ)
c˙
c
+ (γ − γσ)
m˙
m
= −(1− αθ)ηBkη−1N + δ + ρ
This system of equations is separable. For solving the system for the endoge-
nous variables c,m, kN , pi we are going to use the last three equations. In
the government’s budget constraint x is then defined by m and pi. (The role
of the transversality condition is to rule out through a terminal restriction
certain not optimal dynamic paths that would otherwise be possible.) This
also means that we have three equations and four variables to define, so the
system is underdetermined. We will need another equation, which will be a
policy function describing economic (here monetary) policy: the monetary
policy rule.
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5 Dynamics of monetary policy rules
Let us now turn to the analysis of the transitional dynamics. The model
described so far does not say anything about monetary policy, we have not
included a policy function. This study however is concerned with comparing
different monetary policy rules for the model economy, since I am interested
in the question how the different strategies a national bank can follow affect
the transition.
I will examine four different monetary policy strategies: money supply rule,
nominal interest rate peg, inflation targeting (defined in a special way, as
fixing the rate of inflation) and an interest rate feedback-rule.15 The exact
definitions of these will be given in the corresponding subsections below.
5.1 Money supply rule
Money supply rule means nominal money supply targeting. We suppose
that the national bank controls the nominal (per capita) money supply, so
it can determine its growth rate. If we denote this growth rate by ω, then
the growth rate of the real balances will be m˙
m
= ω − pi. This is the fourth
equation in this first case, where the new variable ω is exogenous. Using this
for substituting pi in (12) and then using the result also in (13) we end up





β − 1− βσ
[







β − 1− βσ
[









k˙N = (1− αθ)Bk
η
N − δkN − c (16)
The steady-state is defined as the long-term equilibrium. Here the levels
of the different variables reached are optimal, so no more change is required.
This is now identical to the so-called balanced growth path, since here there
is no growth in the long run (all factors affecting the long-run growth rate
of the economy, e.g. rate of growth of the population, technological progress,
15The money supply rule is typically not used nowadays. I decided to include it in the
analysis for two reasons. First, I wanted to get a more or less complete picture checking
all the main rules. Secondly, its use has a long history and was analyzed in many papers,
so this way the results can be compared. Especially, this is the rule examined in Fischer
(1979) on whose work I was building when introducing money into the model.
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have been assumed to be zero).16 This means that in the steady state m˙ =
c˙ = k˙N = 0. From the monetary policy rule we then have ω = pi
∗, while
m˙/m = c˙/c = 0 leads to (1 − αθ)ηBk∗η−1N = δ + ρ according to the above
equations. Hence, money is superneutral: changing the growth rate of the
nominal money supply affects only inflation; for the real variables it does not
matter, since they are uniquely determined by the parameters of the model
(the equation given here defines k∗N , then the resource constraint gives c
∗).
In this model the steady-state real interest rate is the discount rate ρ as
shown by the above equation determining k∗N (and as was referred to before,
see section 4, p.16.). This means that the rate at which future utility is
discounted equals the rate of return that can be generated by investing one
more unit of capital, so there is no motivation to change the allocation (we
are in the steady state). Throughout this section I will assume ρ = rw, which
means that the domestic economy is neither more nor less impatient than the
world economy (since about the world economy we already assumed that it is
in its steady state, so its real rate equals the subjective discount rate abroad).
It can also be interpreted as having the same steady-states with access to
international capital markets as when there is no international borrowing and




























































To investigate on the stability of the steady-state and the transition path
16Otherwise the balanced growth path of the economy would be the steady state of an
adequately transformed model. Actually the variables have to be divided by the long-run
rate of growth and the equilibrium of the thus transformed system will be the steady state,
when variables do not change any more. The original variables then increase by the rate
of long-run growth, which can be the same for all variables, but also different, depending
on the precise form of the model.
17Barro et. al. (1995), p.110.
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The trace of the transition matrix trace = ρ+ (β+γ)(1−σ)−1
β−1−βσ
(ω+ ρ) is positive
because of the assumptions of the model. Since the trace is the sum of the
three eigenvalues its positivity excludes all roots being negative.






< 0. This is the product
of the eigenvalues, which means that there is either one or three negative
roots. But this last possibility has already been excluded, so there is only
one negative (stable) root. The transition path leading to the steady state
is thus uniquely determined.19
The characteristic equation (µ stands for the eigenvalue)20:
f(µ, ω) = −µ3 + µ2
[
ρ+ (ω + ρ)
(β + γ)(1− σ)− 1







β − 1− βσ
+
(γ−γσ+1)(η−1)(δ+ρ)








(η − 1)(δ + ρ)(ω + ρ)







Monetary policy is not superneutral along the transition path if dµ
dω
6= 0
evaluated at the negative eigenvalue (the negative eigenvalue shows the speed






18In the analysis I will follow the path laid out in Fischer (1979) where also this rule
was analysed (but there the examination of local stability is done in a linearised version).
Note that this way we approximate values close to the steady-state. Values far from it
cannot be examined analytically, only numerically. This paper is confined to the analytical
examination now, but later I would also like to analyse (a stochastic version of) the model
by numerical methods.
19Negative roots are the stable ones representing convergence towards the steady-state,
while positive roots show unstable, diverging paths. If there is only one negative root, this
means that we can determine the stable transition path uniquely.
20The characteristic equation is actually a function of not only these two variables, but
also η, which in turn depends on θ, the openness of the economy. But in order to keep the
problem simpler and to get results for the effects of the monetary policy only, we regard
η as constant or exogenous here.
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Since f(0, ω) = det < 0 and f(µ, ω) = 0 at the negative root, the func-
tion is decreasing there, so ∂f/∂µ < 0, which means that the sign of the
derivative we are looking for is the same as the sign of ∂f/∂ω. We therefore






(β + γ)(1− σ)− 1
β − 1− βσ
]
(µ2 − µρ) +
(η − 1)(δ + ρ)







The characteristic equation can now be written:
f(µ, ω) = −µ(µ2 − µρ)− µ





β − 1− βσ
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β − 1− βσ













(β + γ)(1− σ)− 1
−
γ − γσ + 1
β − 1− βσ
]
When µ < 0, the partial derivative is multiplied by a positive term on the
left-hand side of (20), so its sign is that of the right-hand side, which can be
shown to be negative when σ 6= 1. When σ = 1 (the case of a logarithmic
utility function), then ∂f/∂ω = 0.
Hence, dµ/dω ≤ 0 evaluated at the unique negative root. For a logarithmic
utility function, money is superneutral also along the transition path, but in
any other cases it is not: the greater the growth rate of money, the greater in
absolute value is the speed of convergence. Thus to speed up convergence we
need monetary expansion, which will however also lead to higher steady-state
inflation. This is a counterintuitive result at first sight, since there seems
to be a consensus among economists that price stability is the best basis
for economic growth, whereas in an inflationary environment the prospects
for growth are fading. Here in this setup under money supply rule higher
inflation seems to be the price for faster convergence.
It is not easy to give an intuitive explanation for this result. First of all,
it is not obvious whether the rise in ω will induce a more than proportional
increase in inflation or a less than proportional one. Fischer starts from
noting that the necessarily increasing inflation devalues the money stock at
disposal, so its real value will decrease causing a lower value of wealth. This
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will result in a lower rate of consumption, enabling a faster convergence.
Fischer however mentions that this logic is not really right as this would
imply the result also for the logarithmic utility function where the effect is
not present. He suspects the second order cross derivatives to be the channel
of transmission, but there is no simple relationship as the sign of this cross
derivative depends on the parameter σ and can be different. (Fischer (1979),
pp.1438-1439.)
An increase (decrease) in the growth rate of the money supply will most
likely increase (decrease) m˙/m, except for the case when the increase (de-
crease) of inflation exceeds the change of ω. In empirical works consumption
smoothing is a usual result, that’s why σ > 1 is often assumed. In this
case the growth rate of consumption changes differently relative to that of
the real balances ceteris paribus, as seen in section 4 (p.16.), that is c˙/c
decreases (increases), which enables a faster (slower) convergence. On the
other hand as known from the literature (see e.g. Walsh (2003), p.55.), the
equilibrium in a money in the utility function model is unique with ucm > 0,
which however holds for σ < 1 here. Then the two growth rates change in
the same direction, that is in this case probably the increase of ω causes a
more than proportional increase in inflation (for example because inflation
is typically higher in this case), that is m˙/m will decrease in the end, and so
will c˙/c allowing for faster convergence. In the case of a logarithmic utility
function, that is σ = 1 there is no relationship between the growth rates of
consumption and real balances. We have seen that the path of consumption
is determined solely by the difference in the rates of return, so it cannot be
influenced by changing ω (which means that convergence cannot be affected
either).
5.2 Fixing the nominal interest rate
In this case the monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate instead
of deciding on the growth rate of the money supply. We know that the






denote it by i. In the case of an interest rate rule an adequate level of
i is chosen and then kept constant. Now this will be our policy function
representing a fourth relationship between the variables.













(β + γ)(1− σ)− 1
[
−(1− αθ)ηBkη−1N + δ + ρ
]
(21)
k˙N = (1− αθ)Bk
η
N − δkN − c (22)
The steady-state is the same as in the previous case (19.o.), where pi∗
depends on the chosen nominal interest rate (pi∗ = i− (1−αθ)ηBk∗η−1N + δ).
In the steady-state money is superneutral, the real variables are determined
independently of monetary policy. The chosen nominal interest rate uniquely
determines the steady-state inflation rate. The steady-state real balances




























The trace of the transition matrix is simply trace = ρ > 0 and the determi-




) < 0. This means that we have a positive
and a negative eigenvalue, so an unstable and one stable saddle-path. The





(η − 1)(δ + ρ)







As we can see, in this case monetary policy is superneutral also along the
transition path (the convergence speed does not depend on the variable of
monetary policy, the nominal interest rate). However, the speed of conver-





> 0, the more open the economy is (the higher is θ), the higher in absolute
value is the speed of convergence (the higher is |µ|).
To sum up, under interest rate rule money is completely neutral, there
is nothing the monetary authority can do to influence convergence. What
it can and should use its policy for is influencing the nominal variables and
especially the inflation rate. As we saw, nominal variables depend solely
on monetary policy. It means that many steady-state equilibria can exist
with the same values for the real variables and differing nominal ones. In a
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model with a more detailed specification here the not traditional channel of
the transmission mechanism takes on special relevance: expectations about
future inflation are crucial in determining which of the possible equilibrium
outputs will be realised (but for simplicity the model used here abstracts from
an explicit inclusion of expectations). So by setting the nominal interest rate
this should be taken into account. What matters for the convergence is the
degree of openness, a more open economy have better chances to catch up
more quickly than the more closed ones.
Here the intuition for the neutrality result is simple: through the fix-
ing of the nominal interest rate the marginal rate of substitution between
money and consumption (thus the ratio of holdings of real balances and
consumption, as well) will also be fixed. Because of this, real balances and
consumption grow at the same rate and there is no way to induce any change
in this relationship. The system will contain only real variables (c and kN)
as m can be expressed by using c in a very simple way.
The result concerning the effect of openness on convergence can also be eas-
ily explained: the more open the economy is (the higher is the share of the
traded goods’ “sector” in output, kT ), the higher is the amount of funds
borrowed from abroad (d = kT ). This implies a higher rate of investment
into capital used in the traded goods’ production, so the accumulation of this
type of capital (and thus also convergence) can be faster.
5.3 Inflation targeting
In the case of inflation targeting (in its simple form assumed here) the mone-
tary authority controls inflation directly. Again, it decides on a level regarded
as adequate and then keeps inflation constant at that level.21 We again start
with differentiating (12) with respect to time, which using the constancy of







(η − 1)(1− αθ)ηBkη−1N
[




(1− αθ)ηBkη−1N − δ + pi
21The definition used here is a very simple, special definition of inflation targeting.
We could not include forms taking expectations into account, however, as the model is
deterministic.
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(γ − γσ)(η − 1)(1− αθ)ηBkη−1N
[








(β + γ)(1− σ)− 1
[
−(1− αθ)ηBkη−1N + δ + ρ
]
(24)
k˙N = (1− αθ)Bk
η
N − δkN − c (25)
The steady-state is again the same (19.o.) with pi∗ chosen by the monetary
authority and m∗ determined by (23) as in the previous section, while the































. If σ > 1 (the case of neg-
ative second order cross partial derivatives), then this is surely positive,




< 0, which means that the steady-state is saddle-
point stable. The negative eigenvalue gives us the speed of convergence:
2µ = trace(η, pi)−
√
trace(η, pi)2 − 4det(η)
As we can see, in this case monetary policy is not superneutral along the
transition path, the chosen inflation rate influences the speed of convergence.
Because of the uncertainty about the sign of the trace and the term (γ−γσ),
however, it is difficult to have a clear-cut result about this relationship if the
trace is positive. If σ < 1 and the trace is negative (which is not necessarily
true even with this assumption), then surely ∂µ
∂pi
> 0. In this case the higher
the inflation rate is, the smaller in absolute value is the convergence speed.
Although for σ > 1 not, but for σ = 1 we also have a unique result in line with
the preceding: here money is superneutral in transition, the choice of inflation
rate does not affect the speed of convergence (the case of a logarithmic utility
function).
The speed of convergence depends also on the degree of openness of the
economy. We know that ∂η
∂θ
< 0, but with determining the sign of ∂µ
∂η
we have
similar problems as in the previous case. Again, if σ < 1 and the trace is
negative then we know for sure that ∂µ
∂η
> 0, so the more open the economy
is (the higher is θ), the higher in absolute value is the speed of convergence
(the higher is |µ|). Otherwise we cannot be sure about the relationship.
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In the case of the inflation targeting regime we thus have results being
consistent with intuition: lower inflation can help convergence under certain
conditions. This then contradicts the results of the section analysing the
money supply rule. That strategy resulted in a trade-off between convergence
speed and inflation, here this is not present, we have the opposite case. But
without knowing more about our parameter values we cannot be sure about
these relationships now. As far as openness is concerned, we have the usual
result here too, but again only under the same conditions and not as a general
case.
The intuition is similar to what we had before: the increase of inflation
reduces the real value of our money holdings, which for the case of σ <
1 (when we can be sure about the effect) because of “complementarity”
implies the fall of c. The saving rate will thus increase, convergence will be
faster. In the case of a logarithmic utility function the path of consumption is
determined independently of money as seen before, so then we cannot see any
relationships between the speed of convergence and the variable of monetary
policy (the inflation rate in this case) either.
5.4 Interest rate feedback-rule
In this case the monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate again,
but changing it in line with inflation and not keeping it constant. It means
that the central bank has a reaction function in inflation: i = g(pi) and
g′(pi) > 0, so when inflation is higher, the nominal interest rate is raised and
vice versa. This is going to be the fourth equation in this case analysed as
last. When g′(pi) > 1 we call the monetary policy active (interest rate is
raised more than inflation increases), when g′(pi) < 1 then it is passive (the
change of the interest rate is less than that of inflation).22
This means using equation (12) that γc
βm
= g(pi) and differentiating this with









It is also true using (12) that (1−αθ)ηBkη−1N − δ+pi = g(pi). Differentiating
this with respect to time while expressing kN as a function of pi and using
22The differentiation between active and passive economic policy was first used by Leeper
(1991) in his paper analysing the interactions of monetary and fiscal policy. Their formal
definitions in the form used here, as well were given by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
who examined their characteristics concerning the uniqueness and stability of equilibrium
in more articles, see e.g. Benhabib et. al. (2001a), (2001b) and (2002).
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(η − 1)[g(pi) + δ − pi]
g′(pi)− 1
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[(β + γ)(1− σ)− 1]g(pi)[g′(pi)− 1]
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ρ+ pi − g(pi)
























The steady-state is again the same (19.o.), but here the monetary variables
remain undetermined if only the reaction function g is specified. For any in-
flation rate m∗ = γc
∗
βg(pi∗)
, where g(pi∗) = ρ+pi∗. The log-linear approximation






















In this case trace = ρ+
(γ−γσ)g′(pi∗)(ε−1)(δ+ρ)(δ− δ+ρε )
[(β+γ)(1−σ)−1]g(pi∗)[g′(pi∗)−1]
. If σ > 1 and the monetary
policy is active or if σ < 1 and the monetary policy is passive, then this is
surely positive, otherwise in general we cannot determine the sign. The
determinant is det =
(ε−1)(δ+ρ)(δ− δ+ρε )
(β+γ)(1−σ)−1
< 0, we have a saddle-point stable
steady-state again. The speed of convergence is now:
2µ = trace(g(pi), η)−
√
trace(g(pi), η)2 − 4det(η)
As we can see, in this case monetary policy is not superneutral along the
transition path, the chosen reaction function (and so the inflation rate, as
well) influences the speed of convergence. Because of the uncertainty about
the sign of the trace and the term (γ − γσ), however, we do not have a
general result about this relationship. If σ < 1 and the monetary policy
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is active and the trace is negative (which is not necessarily true even with
these assumptions) or if σ > 1 and the monetary policy is passive and the
trace is negative (again, this is not necessarily true), then surely ∂µ
∂g(pi)
> 0.
In this case the higher the inflation rate is, the smaller in absolute value is
the convergence speed.
The degree of openness of the economy also affects the speed of convergence.
We know that ∂η
∂θ
< 0, but with determining the sign of ∂µ
∂η
we have similar
problems here. Again, only in the same two cases as for the influence of
monetary policy can we say something about this relationship: then ∂µ
∂η
> 0,
so the more open the economy is (the higher is θ), the higher in absolute
value is the speed of convergence (the higher is |µ|).
This rule though looking quite similar to the interest rate targeting pro-
duces very different results: money is not superneutral in the transition.
Furthermore, here the monetary variables and the inflation rate are undeter-
mined highlighting the possibility of multiple equilibria and the importance
of expectations. Apart for this we find stronger similarities with the results
under inflation targeting: lower inflation speeds up convergence, but only
under certain parameter values. In general we cannot be sure about the ef-
fects of monetary policy. The same is true for the effects of openness, but
under some specific circumstances we have the usual result that more open
economies are likely to experience faster convergence.
We have another general result in line with the previous cases for a loga-
rithmic utility function: if σ = 1 then money is superneutral also in the
transition, the monetary authority cannot influence the speed of convergence
with means at its disposal.
Except for this last case, it is not obvious to explain this quite compli-
cated result. Let us first have a look at the second case, where σ < 1, so
we have positive cross derivatives. With active monetary policy the nominal
interest rate is increased more than the change in inflation, so real returns
rise. Here the substitution effect dominates, so the agents are likely to save
more and consume less. If the inflation rate is higher, the real value of money
holdings will fall and this would cause the consumption also to fall because
its marginal utility decreases (“complementarity”). Moreover, the ratio c/m
has to increase, because the nominal interest rate is higher. This means that
consumption falls less relative to the decrease in the real balances.
In the other case when σ > 1 we have a negative relationship between money
holdings in real terms and consumption (“substitutability”). If monetary
policy is passive, the rise in the nominal interest rate will fall short of the
change in the inflation rate, so real returns fall. Here the income effect domi-
nates, so this will again induce increased saving and decreased consumption.
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As real balances decrease with inflation, this causes the marginal utility of
consumption and thus consumption to increase. It is not obvious which effect
dominates, but the c/m ratio has to increase again, so it is more likely that
consumption will increase.
With logarithmic utility function monetary policy has surely no impact on
the speed of convergence, since the path of consumption is determined by
the difference in returns only.
6 Conclusion
The goal of the model presented here was the examination of the question
relevant for the new member states of the European Union with the help of
mixing the convergence literature and literature of monetary policy, whether
it matters for convergence what monetary policy rule is followed. On the
basis of the analysis in this paper the answer is definitely yes: the model
economy behaves very differently in transition under the different monetary
policy rules assumed, although the equilibrium values of the real variables
are the same in each case.
I shortly summarize (first in two tables) the main results.
Dimension Steady state
Money supply 3: money is superneutral
rule c, kN , m
Interest rate 2: money is superneutral
targeting c, kN
Inflation 2: money is superneutral
targeting c, kN
Feedback-rule 2: money is superneutral, nominal
c, pi variables not uniquely defined!
Transition: for faster convergence ...
Money supply faster monetary expansion
rule
Interest rate money is superneutral here too!
targeting
Inflation lower inflation rate
targeting (not a general result!)
Feedback-rule lower inflation
(not a general result!)
As can be seen also from the tables, in the case of a money supply rule
the system describing the behaviour of the model economy during transi-
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tion is three-dimensional with the variables c, kn, m, in all the other cases
we have a two-dimensional system. The steady-state inflation rate is deter-
mined through the chosen value for the growth rate of the nominal money
supply (ω) and through this all monetary variables, while the real ones are
determined independently of money by the parameters of the model (so as
in all of the cases, money does not matter in the steady-state). The model
is dynamically stable, there is a unique stable transition path. Money is not
superneutral during transition: after controlling for openness (considering it
as constant), the speed of convergence is higher, the higher is the growth rate
of the money supply. This calls for increasing the nominal money supply, we
should not however forget that this results in a higher steady-state inflation
rate, as well.
The interest rate rule stands out leading to very different results from the
others. We have a two-dimensional system here in c, kN , which is saddle-point
stable (there is again one stable transition path), but in this case money is
superneutral also in transition. What matters is the degree of openness: the
greater it is, the faster convergence will be (this is the standard result we get
in the examined cases).
Under inflation targeting the system is again two-dimensional in the same
variables (c, kN). Here the monetary authority controls inflation directly and
through the choice of its steady-state level (pi∗) the monetary variables are
also determined in the steady-state. The system is saddle-point stable. We
do not have clear-cut results here however. Money matters for the transition,
but it is not obvious how, under certain conditions a higher inflation rate will
reduce the speed of convergence after controlling for openness.
For the feedback-rule we have very similar results: a two-dimensional system
but now in c, pi, one stable saddle-path and uncertainty about the effects
of monetary policy in transition (that are however present). Again under
certain conditions a higher inflation rate results in slower convergence with
openness kept constant. Both cases are however contradicting the results un-
der the money supply rule, where higher money growth rate (and so higher
inflation) can lead to faster convergence. The only difference from the in-
flation targeting apart for the different system variables is that monetary
variables remain undetermined in the steady-state in this case.
In all three cases where monetary policy affects convergence, for a special
case of the utility function (σ = 1, logarithmic form) the superneutrality of
money holds also in the transition. Also, in the three cases examined (fixing
the nominal interest rate, inflation targeting and the interest rate feedback-
rule) openness always furthered, speeded up convergence, but under the last
two rules this relationship was not generally true (it held only for certain
parameter values). The result is consistent with the view of economists: a
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higher degree of openness enables a faster adjustment. The mechanism be-
hind the result in the model is also clear: a more important role of kT (which
shows a greater openness here) enables a greater reliance on foreign sources,
thus increasing the available resources and leading to faster convergence.
The analysis of this simple model illustrates that the dynamic behaviour
of the economy can differ to a great extent under different monetary policy
rules already in a very simple setup. The model presented combined the
elements regarded as inevitable for examining the question (small open econ-
omy, possibility of analysing convergence, monetary policy), but many other,
also important elements have still been missing. The most relevant among
them for a small open economy is probably the exchange rate, since in these
countries the exchange rate channel is often considered to be a more impor-
tant channel of monetary transmission than the interest rate channel. An
obvious extension is thus the analysis of similar problems in models where
the exchange rate can also explicitly be taken into account. The model shown
here is however not eligible for including the exchange rate, as resulting from
the assumption used to model convergence (constrained capital mobility) the
variables that could potentially be affected by the exchange rate fall out of
the model. Hence, to explicitly introduce the exchange rate a different setup
capable for analysing convergence has to be used. It would be possible for
example to use a convergence model, where investment incurs adjustment
costs (Benczu´r (2003), Benczu´r–Ko´nya (2004), these are monetary models),
or the credit supply curve is increasing (with higher indebtedness the inter-
est rate on the new debts is higher), such as Chatterjee et. al. (2001) (where
both assumptions are used, but in the framework of a real model).
There are other obvious extensions. It can be worth modifying the model
by assuming different productivity parameters for the production technology
of the sectors (different As) and examine whether the Balassa–Samuelson
effect is valid in this two-sector model. An important extension would be the
numerical examination of the model to see the complete transition path. But
this is more interesting in a stochastic model, so first it could be justifiable
to set up and solve a version of the model explicitly allowing for uncertainty.
The model shown here however already in its present form highlights the
differences in the behaviour of the model economy under applying different
monetary strategies and due to the simple structure a local analysis is also an-
alytically possible. Since the exchange rate is not (and as I said before, could
not be) explicitly included, it can be used to characterise such a situation in
the first place, where changes in the exchange rate are not essential for the
economic decisions – such as the situation after the introduction of the euro,
where the currency used by the main trading partners is not different from
the one used in the respective country. The analysis of the model is therefore
31
despite all the listed shortcomings in any case theoretically interesting and
justifiable.
References
[1] Barro, Robert J. – Mankiw, Gregory N. – Sala-i-Martin, Xavier (1995):
Capital Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth, American Economic
Review, Vol. 85, 1, pp.103-115., March
[2] Benczu´r, Pe´ter (2003): Nomina´lis sokkok a´tmeneti rea´lhata´sa egy ke´t-
szektoros no¨vekede´si modellben, MNB Fu¨zetek, 2003/9, November
[3] Benczu´r, Pe´ter – Ko´nya, Istva´n (2004): Nominal growth in a small open
economy, manuscript, for the October 2004 conference titled Economic
Growth and Development by the Institute of Economics of the MTA
(September)
[4] Benczu´r, Pe´ter – Ko´nya, Istva´n [2005]: A flexible price theory of equi-
librium real exchange rates and output, manuscript (September), for
the September 2005 4th Macroeconomic Policy Research Workshop
on Nominal Exchange Rates and the Real Economy of the National
Bank of Hungary, downloaded from: http://english.mnb.hu/Engine.
aspx?page=mnben konf fomenu&ContentID=6894
[5] Benhabib, Jess – Schmitt-Grohe´, Stephanie – Uribe, Martin (2001a):
Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria, American Economic Review,
Vol. 91, March, pp.167-186.
[6] Benhabib, Jess – Schmitt-Grohe´, Stephanie – Uribe, Martin (2001b):
The Perils of Taylor Rules, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 96, pp.40-
69.
[7] Benhabib, Jess – Schmitt-Grohe´, Stephanie – Uribe, Martin (2002):
Avoiding Liquidity Traps, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, No. 3,
pp.535-563.
[8] Chatterjee, Santanu – Sakoulis, Georgios – Turnovsky, Stephen (2001):
Unilateral Capital Transfers, Public Investment, and Economic Growth,
European Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 6, pp.1077-1103.
[9] Del Negro, Marco – Schorfheide, Frank – Smets, Frank – Wouters, Raf
(2004): On the Fit and Forecasting Performance of New Keynesian Mod-
els, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper, 2004-37 (Decem-
ber)
32
[10] Fischer, Stanley (1979): Capital Accumulation on the Transition Path
in a Monetary Optimizing Model, Econometrica, Vol. 47, 6 (November)
[11] Gal´ı, Jordi (2002): New Perspectives on Monetary Policy, Inflation, and
the Business Cycle, NBER, Working Paper, 8767
[12] Gal´ı, Jordi - Monacelli, Tommaso (2001): Monetary Policy and Ex-
change Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy, NBER, Working Pa-
per, 8905
[13] Lane, Philip R. (2001): International trade and economic convergence:
the credit channel, Oxford Economic Papers 53, pp.221-240.
[14] Leeper, Eric M. (1991): Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary
and fiscal policies, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 27, pp.129-147.
[15] Obstfeld, Maurice - Rogoff, Kenneth (1995): Exchange Rate Dynamics
Redux, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 103, 3, pp.624-660.
[16] Obstfeld, Maurice - Rogoff, Kenneth (1998): Risk and Exchange Rates,
NBER, Working Paper, 6694
[17] Sidrauski, Miguel (1967): Rational Choice and Patterns of Growth in a
Monetary Economy, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceed-
ings, 57, pp.534-544.
[18] Smets, Frank – Wouters, Raf (2003): An estimated stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium model of the euro area, Journal of Economic Associ-
ation, Vol. 1, No. 5 (September), pp.1123-1175.
[19] Summers, Robert – Heston, Alan [1991]: The Penn World Table (Mark
5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, May, pp.327–368.
[20] Walsh, Carl E. (2003): Monetary Theory and Policy, second edition,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
[21] Woodford, Michael (2003): Interest and Prices, Foundations of a Theory
of Monetary Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton
33
